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1. Introduction 
In recent years, data processing has evolved rapidly at short notice with computer-based 
technologies. These technologies can be used to examine the attitude of large groups or 
populations as well as the tendency of the consumers and likings of a speciﬁc individual. Personal 
data is being gathered, stored, processed and pervaded the world in many of our daily habits by 
using the technologies. Similarly, banks and insurance companies rely on risk profiles of customers 
to take certain decisions, and internet companies like Google and Facebook use such profiles for 
advertising purposes. On the other hand, it is irrefutable that the increase of data processing is 
pivotal to advance in the security, efﬁciency, and convenience of contemporary life in an information 
rich world. These technologies have supplied considerable developments in terms of the detection 
and prevention of crime, coordination of medical services, impacts of the public.1  
Therefore, there are many benefits of technological development as well as harm related to 
personal data. It is obvious that personal data is wide open to abuse without protection in this digital 
era. Privacy interests every single human being in his or her most personal and private matters. It is 
a fundamental human right, however, it is almost constantly in the line of fire due to contemporary 
technological advancement. In the last decade, the law in Europe and the United States has 
managed to reinforce the ability of the States to obtain communications data at the expense of 
privacy.2 Privacy questions have become an integral part of the international agenda, turning 
individuals' data protection into a serious global issue. The extent of the exposed surveillance 
program by the public authorities led to reconsiderations of current policies and technologies. 
Individuals now fear that both legal and technological means constituted with legitimate purposes, 
such as counter-terrorism and crime control, are also increasingly used for total social control.3 
While some claim that privacy is dead, others feel that it is now more than ever that privacy needs 
protection.4 Thus, the advancement of digital technologies has raised main questions about the role 
of courts from a fundamental rights approach.5  
As is common knowledge, the basic document of the European human rights framework is 
undeniably the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights6 (ECHR). Concluded in 
1950 within the framework of the Council of Europe, it was designed to protect individuals’ 
                                                 
1 Christopher Kuner, ‘Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, and 
Future’ TILT Law & Technology Working Paper, (2010) 331.  
2 Joel R. Reidenberg, ‘The Data Surveillance State in the United States and Europe’ Wake Forest Law Review (2013) 2.  
3 Ilina Georgieva, ‘The Right to Privacy under Fire Foreign Surveillance under the NSA and the GCHQ and Its Compatibility 
with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 ECHR’ Utrecht J. Int'L & EUR. L, vol 31(2015) 104. 
4 Bart van der Sloot, ‘Privacy as Human Flourishing: Could a Shift towards Virtue Ethics Strengthen Privacy Protection in the 
Age of Big Data’ J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech.and Elec. Com. L,vol 5 (2014) 230. 
5 Evangelia Psychogiopoulou and Maja Brkan, ‘Introduction: Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital Environment’ 
in M. Brkan and E. Psychogiopoulou (eds), Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital Environment (EE Publishing, 
UK Edward Elgar Publishing, UK  2017) 1. 
6 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted in Council of Europe 4 
November 1950, entered into force 1953) ECHR 
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fundamental rights and freedoms.7 Individuals may appeal the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR, the Court) for the breaches of rights that are guaranteed in the ECHR.8 Therefore, the 
numerous cases related to the personal data have been brought before the Court. Accordingly, 
existing law has been needed to interpret in order to conclude these cases.  Since, ‘The ECHR is a 
living instrument which … must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’9. Moreover, the 
Court has sought to protect fundamental rights by reviewing the interference in the light of public 
interests as the prevention of disorder or crime or national security. In this regard, the ECtHR is the 
crucial body to reflect a perspective to the State Parties.10   
The Court has evaluated the personal data under article 8 of ECHR, in the scope of privacy. 
However, the concept and value of privacy need careful reconsidering, as the traditional approach 
to privacy seems unfit to resolve cases which include the threats posed by Big Data which is 
defined as collecting huge amounts of data without a pre-established goal or purpose, about an 
undefined number of people.11 
In this study, firstly, personal data will be examined in its general meaning and background. Then 
the scope of the personal data will be set out and analysed in terms of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. 
In the sense of article 8 of the ECHR, the classic cases of the ECtHR which are issued regarded 
with the protection of personal data will be evaluated. Besides, this study will argue the ECtHR’s 
perception in terms of access to personal data, collection, storage, and disclosure of personal data 
as important underlying values while discussing cases under Article 8 ECHR.  Moreover, it will be 
addressed how the Court has assessed the proper rationales in order to limit such right. Thereafter, 
the innovations of the ECtHR will be discussed concerning the complicated cases such as mass 
data and surveillance. Coping with these challenges how the ECtHR has applied the relevant 
principles in practice under article 8 of the ECHR. In addition, the Court’s role as guardian of the 
ECHR is particularly vital to scrutiny and assess the Contracting Parties’ surveillance activities via 
the applications, thus, the last part will argue whether the ECtHR’s approach could be adequate to 
resolve these challenging cases. 
1.1 The Protection of Personal Data and in more General Extent and its Background  
The appearance of data protection laws is not long past. With the emergence of data technology 
during the 1960s, there was a growing requirement for more specific rules to protect individuals by 
                                                 
7 Paul De Hert, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty within the European Human Rights Framework. A Critical Reading of the 
Court’s Case Law in the light of Surveillance and Criminal Law Enforcement Strategies after 9/11’ Utrecht Law Review, vol 1 
(September, 2005) 
8 Psychogiopoulou and Brkan (n 5) 1. 
9 Tyrer v the UK App no 5856/72 (ECtHR, 25 April 1978) para 31. 
10 Psychogiopoulou and Brkan (n 5) 1. 
11 Sloot, ‘Privacy as Human Flourishing: Could a Shift towards Virtue Ethics Strengthen Privacy Protection in the Age of Big 
Data’ (n 4) 230. 
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safeguarding their personal data.12 Thus, it is with some justification that data protection laws have 
been characterised as regulatory reactions to technological advancements.13 The pieces of 
legislation in the area emerged at early 1970s. The international measures, particularly for the aim 
of guarding privacy interests against the risk of misusing data by automatic means, was conducted 
by regional bodies, notably European ones.14  
However, there are large number of legal instruments on data protection currently. Moreover, 
several international instruments have introduced data protection. Particularly, two international 
data protection instruments are addressed as primary sources. Since they include the main 
principles of data protection which are present in national data protection laws and they are referred 
to effective models by international and domestic initiatives concerned data protection. These 
instruments are the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CoE Convention) and the EC Directive on the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (EC Directive).15  
CoE Convention is the hereto unique international treaty particularly related to data protection. It 
remains important as it has impacted and materialised the main principles of most countries’ current 
data protection laws along with the EC Directive.16 It has three basic elements: it formulates major 
orders for data protection measures to be adopted by contracting States, it establishes special rules 
about transborder data flows and it sets out mechanisms for advisory.17 Personal data is defined in 
article 2(a) of the CoE Convention as18 ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual.’  
The EC Directive is the most extensive and complex of the instruments. It establishes a set of rules 
capable of broad effect and application. Similar but more comprehensive definition compared to the 
CoE Convention, article 2 (a) of the EC Directive introduces the personal data as: ‘any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or  
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity.’ The purpose of the CoE Convention is addressed in article 1 as: ‘to secure in the territory 
of each Party for every individual ... respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in 
particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him.’ 
                                                 
12 Handbook on European Data Protection Law (2018) < https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-coe-edps-
2018 > accessed 01 July 2019 
13 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic, and Limits (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 94. 
14 James Michael, Privacy and Human Rights: an International and Comparative Study, with Special Reference to 
Developments in Information Technology (UNESCO, 1994) 32.   
15 Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic, and Limits  (n 13) 30. 
16 ibid 31. 
17 Michael (no 14) 35.   
18 Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic, and Limits  (n 13) 41. 
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The core principles of data protection are manifest in article 5 of the CoE Convention19 and article 6 
(1) of the EC Directive20. These principles can be sum up as:  
‘(i) personal data should be gathered by fair and lawful means; (ii) the amount of personal data 
gathered should be limited to what is necessary to achieve the purpose(s) of gathering the data; (iii) 
personal data should be gathered for specified and lawful purposes and not processed in ways that 
are incompatible with those purposes; (iv) use of personal data for purposes other than those 
specified should occur only with the consent of the data subject or with legal authority; (v) personal 
data should be accurate, complete and relevant in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed; (vi) security measures should be implemented to protect personal data from unintended 
or unauthorized disclosure, destruction or modification; (vii) data subjects should be informed of, 
and given access to, data on them held by others, and be able to rectify these data if inaccurate or 
misleading; and (viii) parties responsible for processing data on other persons should be 
accountable for complying with the above principles.’21 
The breaches of the CoE’s core obligations could induce the violation of the right to respect private 
life in many cases of the ECtHR. Moreover, the jurisprudence of ECtHR plays a role in designating 
the meaning of the provisions in the EC Directive.22 In this sense, the Court's former president, Rolv 
Ryssdal’s expression is remarkable in order to evaluate the influence of these instruments on the 
ECtHR: 
‘For our part, we in Strasbourg should not ignore the basic principles laid down in the Data 
Protection Convention in addressing ourselves to those issues which do come before us. Those 
basic principles are a sectoral implementation of Article 8 of the ECHR in the context of automatic 
data processing and may therefore [be employed] in aid in interpreting that provision.’23 
1.2 Personal Data within the Scope of the Right to Respect for Private Life 
The ECHR is one of the main instruments in the human rights system in Europe. Thus, a search 
into how this convention evaluates data protection right is an essential step of any analysis of data 
protection from a human rights approach. The ECHR does not explicitly acknowledge the right to 
data protection.24 At this point, it should be needed to assess the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in order to 
reach the Court’s perspective. Personal data protection plays a primordial role in the exercise of a 
person’s right to respect for his private life enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. The ECtHR 
                                                 
19 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (adopted in Council of 
Europe 28 January 1981, entered into force 01 October 1985) the CoE Convention 
20 Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic, and Limits (n 13) 58. 
21 Lee A. Bygrave, ‘Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties’ Int'L J.L. & Info. Tech., Vol.6  
(1998) 250. 
22 Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic, and Limits (n 13) 35. 
23 Ryssdal, 'Data Protection and the European Convention on Human Rights', in Data Protection, Human Rights and 
Democratic Values, Proceedings of the 13th Conference of Data Protection Commissioners held 2-4 October 1991 in 
Strasbourg (Strasbourg: CoE, 1992), 42. 
24 Nadezhda Purtova, Property Rights in Personal Data, A European Perspective (Wolters Kluwer Law and Business 2012) 
224.   
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repeatedly stated that data protection fell under the protective scope of article 8 of the ECHR. 
Moreover, the ECtHR expressed that it is impossible and unnecessary to attempt an exhaustive 
definition of what "private life" in Article 8 means, thus the concept of private life has been widely 
interpreted.25  
Article 8 (1) of the ECHR sets out the substantive scope of the right to respect for private and family 
life as: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.’ Therefore, it provides little guidance in terms of responding to the question 
whether data protection interests enjoy the ECHR’s protection.26  
Although ECHR does not explicitly include personal data protection, the necessity of personal data 
protection is expressed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In the S. and Marper v UK case, two 
applicants claimed that the retention by the authorities of their fingerprints, cellular samples and 
DNA profiles after their acquittal or discharge induced the violation of the right to respect private 
life.27 The ECtHR has stated that: ‘The protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a 
person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 
8 of the Convention.’28 
The ECtHR introduced personal data as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual’.29 That broad interpretation is conformed with article 2(a) of the CoE Convention and its 
purpose as previously mentioned.30  
Therefore, it should be needed to draw the line of the distinction between private and public in order 
to determine which information can be assessed as ‘relating to an individual’s private life.’ The 
ECtHR has emphasized that private life is not restricted to the inner circle of the individual since the 
improvement of individual’s personality is the keystone of the protection granted by article 8 (1) of 
ECHR.31 This approach is reflected in Shimovolos v Russia Case which is related to the police 
listing and surveillance on applicant’s account of membership in a human rights organisation.32 The 
ECtHR noted that: ‘Article 8 is not limited to the protection of an “inner circle” in which the individual 
may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not 
encompassed within that circle. It also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with 
other human beings and the outside world.’33 
                                                 
25 Bart van der Sloot, Legal Fundamentalism: Is Data Protection Really a Fundamental Right? in R. Leenes, R. van Brakel, S. 
Gutwirth, P. De Hert (eds), Data Protection and Privacy: (In)visibilities and Infrastructures (Springer International Publishing, 
2017) 3.  
26  Purtova (n 24) 224. 
27 S and Marper v UK  App no 30562/04 (ECtHR, 04 December 2008) para 9-25. 
28 ibid para 103. 
29 Amann v Switzerland App no 27798/95 (ECtHR, 16 February 2000) para 69. 
30 Maria Tzanou, The fundamental Right to Data Protection:Normative Value in the Context of Counter-Terrorism 
Surveillance (Hart Publishing 2017) 45. 
31 Psychogiopoulou and Brkan (n 5) 33.  
32 Shimovolos v Russia App no 30194/09 (ECtHR, 21 June 2011) para 5-20. 
33 ibid para 64. 
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The other remarkable example is the Von Hannover v. German case in which a Monegasque 
national, Princess Caroline von Hannover, and a German national, Prince Ernst August von 
Hannover’s (“the applicants”) photos are taken in the public place and published in the German’s 
magazines34, the Court expresses that ‘… the concept of private life extends to aspects relating to 
personal identity, such as a person’s name, photo, or physical and moral integrity; the guarantee 
afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings. 
There is thus a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall 
within the scope of private life. Publication of a photo may thus intrude upon a person’s private life 
even where that person is a public figure.’35  
However, drawing a clear line between private and public activities is sometimes difficult.36 In some 
cases, the Court found that there had been no violation of the right to respect the private life, as the 
data had been reached from the public official documents or the information was general knowledge 
due to the concerning person’s notoriety and regarded with such person’s public life. In this regard, 
it might be that obtaining of publicly accessible data or information concerning records or subjects in 
the public domain would exclude the scope of article 8. Though, while gathering this information, 
specific or intrusive measures should not be used and a specific person should not be targeted or 
such data should not be stored long term in a secret file as well. 37  
Besides, drawing the line of the distinction between private and public, the other essential inquiry is 
assessing which information could be evaluated as personal data. In the S and Marper v UK case, 
ECtHR assesses cellular samples and DNA profiles differently according to the fingerprints. Since 
the Court expresses that ‘the retention of cellular samples and DNA profiles has a more important 
impact on private life than the retention of fingerprints.’ Thus, the ECtHR notes that ‘…the retention 
of both cellular samples and DNA profiles discloses an interference with the applicants’ right to 
respect for their private lives, within the meaning of Article 8 (1) of the Convention.’38 However, in 
terms of the fingerprints, the ECtHR states as: ‘… the retention of fingerprints on the authorities’ 
records in connection with an identified or identifiable individual may in itself give rise, 
notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, to important private-life concerns.’39 
Private life also covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person due to the broader 
concept of article 8 (1). For instance, in the case of Mikulic v. Crotoatia the claimant alleged that the 
                                                 
34 Von Hannover v German App no 59320/00 (ECtHR, 24 June 2004) para 10-53. 
35 ibid para 95. 
36 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European Convention on Human 
Rights,( Oxford University Press 2017) 418. 
37 Karen Reid, A practitioner's Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 876. 
38 S and Marper v UK  App no 30562/04 (ECtHR, 04 December 2008) para 77. 
39 ibid para, 85. 
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proceedings concerning her paternity allegation had failed due to the excessive length of the 
paternity proceedings.40 In the present case, the ECtHR states that: ‘Private life … includes a 
person's physical and psychological integrity and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's 
physical and social identity. Respect for “private life” must also comprise to a certain degree the 
right to establish relationships with other human beings.’41 
The applicant claimed that his proposed expulsion from the United Kingdom to Algeria may make 
him confronted with the inhuman and degrading treatment, and threatened his physical and moral 
integrity in the Bensaid v. The United Kingdom case.42 Although the applicants’ claim regarded to 
article 8 (1) was rejected by the Court, the ECtHR’s notion was remarkable in order to determine the 
scope of personal data as: ‘… elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation 
and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8. Mental health 
must also be regarded as a crucial part of private life associated with the aspect of moral integrity.’43  
Similarly, collection and storage of medical data and other medical records are evaluated as 
personal data in terms of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. A related case is L.H. v Latvia in which Ms 
L.H. asserted that the collection of her personal medical data by a State agency had given rise to a 
violation of the right to respect for her private life.44 The indiscriminate gathering of medical data by 
the public organ responsible for following the quality of medical care was assessed as an 
infringement of article 8 (1) of the ECHR.45 The Court emphasizes that: ‘… the protection of 
personal data, not least medical data, is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of the 
right to respect for his or her private life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Respecting 
the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the Contracting Parties 
to the Convention. It is crucial not only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to 
preserve confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general.’46  
In addition, the Court accepted the individual’s ethnic identity within the scope of the personal data. 
As an illustration, in the Ciubotaru v. Moldova case, the applicant alleged that the authorities 
refused his demand in order to record his ethnicity as stated by him, accordingly, such refusal 
induced a breach of his right to respect for private life.47 The Court determined that ‘… ethnic 
                                                 
40 Mikulic v. Crotoatia App no 53176/99 (ECtHR, 7 February 2002) para 8-32. 
41 ibid para 51. 
42 Bensaid v. The United Kingdom App no 44599/98 (ECtHR, 6 February 2001) para 7-21. 
43 ibid para, 47. 
44 L.H. v. Latvia App no 52019/07  (ECtHR, 29 April 2014) para 3. 
45 David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla Buckley, Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick: Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2018) 540. 
46 L.H. v. Latvia App no 52019/07  (ECtHR, 29 April 2014) para 56. 
47 Ciubotaru v. Moldova App no 27138/04 (ECtHR, 27 April 2010) para 5-13.   
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identity was a detail pertaining to the individual's identity falling within the ambit of Article 8 … an 
individual's ethnic identity constitutes an essential aspect of his or her private life and identity.’48  
Moreover, in the other cases related with the bank accounts’ data, the ECtHR determines that 
banking documents should be evaluated as personal data, even if such data is concerned 
professional activities. In M.N. and others v San Marino case, the applicants’ banking data 
documents were seizure and copied in the context of criminal proceedings. The applicants were 
notified about the measure applied to them about one year after the adoption of the search and 
seizure decisions.49 The applicants then lodged a complaint in terms of such decision which was 
rejected. In the present case, the ECtHR highlighted that: ‘… information retrieved from banking 
documents undoubtedly amounts to personal data concerning an individual, irrespective of it being 
sensitive information or not. Moreover, such information may also concern professional dealings 
and there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of a professional or business nature 
from the notion of “private life”.50  
In the light of evaluated cases related with the consent of personal data, it could be constituted that, 
even if the ECHR does not cover an explicit definition of the personal data, the ECtHR is trying to 
broaden the scope of ‘private life’ in order to fill this gap. Furthermore, the Court emphasises some 
pivotal notions which are essential to be dependent and free individuals in the society such as 
personal development, relationships with other human beings and the outside world, individual 
autonomy, integrity, and identity. In this respect, the diversity of data which is included in the related 
cases proves such an approach.   
2. Personal Data 
2.1 Access to Personal Data 
In particular circumstances, individuals and governments could conflict due to the citizens’ demands 
for accessing their files related to their private life.51 The ECtHR has usually been favour of the 
individuals who tries to reach information in the context of their origins.52 The principal case is 
Gaskin v UK in which the applicant was received into care as a child when attaining the age of 
majority, he tried to learn his past to cope with his problems, though, his demand in order to access 
his files is rejected by the local authority.53 The Court found that: "respect for private life requires 
that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings and 
                                                 
48 ibid para 49-53. 
49 M.N. and Others v San Marino App no 28005/12 (ECtHR, 07 July 2015) para 7-19. 
50 ibid para 51. 
51 Reid (n 37) 876. 
52 Harris, O'Boyle, Bates, and Buckley (n 45) 541. 
53 Gaskin v the United Kingdom App no 10454/83 (ECtHR, 07 July 1989) para 10-12. 
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that in principle they should not be obstructed by the authorities from obtaining such very basic 
information without specific justification".54 
The ECtHR also expressed that ‘…, persons in the situation of the applicant have a vital interest, 
protected by the Convention, in receiving the information necessary to know and to understand their 
childhood and early development. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that confidentiality of 
public records is of importance for receiving objective and reliable information, and that such 
confidentiality can also be necessary for the protection of third persons.’55 
A similar approach has taken place in the Godelli v. Italy case. In the concrete case, the applicant 
could not reach information concerning her birth, since the registered office did not share 
information with. Accordingly, she had no opportunity to learn her origin.56 The court reiterated that: 
‘…the child has a right to know its origins, that right being derived from the notion of private life… 
the right to an identity, which includes the right to know one’s parentage, is an integral part of the 
notion of private life…’57 
In certain situations, access to information could be crucial for the individual in order to eliminate or 
minimize the risks on life and health.58 In Roche v. the United Kingdom case, the Court was asked 
to evaluate a complaint about a member of the British Army who suffered from some respiratory 
diseases due to nerve and mustard gas tests in the Medical Assessment Programme of the army 
and he had not obtained the essential information from the governments, which would have allowed 
him to be treated.59 The ECtHR expresses that ‘… the State has not fulfilled the positive obligation 
to provide an effective and accessible procedure enabling the applicant to have access to all 
relevant and appropriate information that would allow him to assess any risk to which he had been 
exposed during his participation in the tests.60  
In the K.H. and Others v. Slovakia case, the applicants demanded to take photocopies of their 
medical documents by the authorities in order to find out reasons for their infertility and possible 
treatment, however, they have not been permitted to access the documents.61 The Court held that 
there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention and stated as: ‘The complaint in issue 
concerns the exercise by the applicants of their right of effective access to information concerning 
their health and reproductive status. As such it is linked to their private and family lives within the 
meaning of Article 8.62 The ECtHR also added that the exercise of the right under Article 8 to 
                                                 
54 ibid para 39. 
55 ibid para 49. 
56 Godelli v Italy App no 33783/09 (ECtHR, 25 September 2012) para 5-12. 
57 ibid para 50-52. 
58 Harris, O'Boyle, Bates, and Buckley (n 45) 541. 
59 Roche v The United Kingdom App no 32555/96 (ECtHR, 19 October 2005) para 9-33. 
60 ibid para 167. 
61 K.H. and Others v Slovakia App no 32881/04 (ECtHR, 28 April 2009) para 7-10 
62 ibid para 44. 
12 
 
respect for one’s private and family life must be practical and effective, thus the Contracting Parties’ 
positive obligations should extend, in particular such cases where personal data are concerned, to 
the making available to the data subject of copies of his or her data files. 
A specific principle of access to information has also emerged in the context of the security files. For 
instance, in the Turek v. Slovakia the applicant was recorded by the StB as their “agent”, due to 
such registration, the applicant was confronted with a negative security clearance, accordingly, his 
reputation and good name and reputation were brought into disrepute. He could not have the 
opportunity to correct his registration, since he had not had full access to his file.63  
The ECtHR notes that ‘particularly in proceedings related to the operations of state security 
agencies, there may be legitimate grounds to limit access to certain documents and other materials. 
However, in respect of lustration proceedings, this consideration loses much of its validity…, if a 
State is to adopt lustration measures, it must ensure that the persons affected thereby enjoy all 
procedural guarantees under the Convention in respect of any proceedings relating to the 
application of such measures. In the present case, the applicant was asserting his rights in the 
context of an interference with them which had been occasioned by State power and arguably 
without his knowledge. The courts considered it crucial for the applicant to prove that the 
interference was contrary to the applicable rules. These rules were, however, secret and the 
applicant did not have full access to them. On the other hand, the State did have full access. In 
those circumstances, and irrespectively of whether the placing of the burden of proof on the 
applicant was compatible with domestic law, that requirement placed an unrealistic burden on him 
in practice… It was thus excessive. The applicant’s proceedings therefore cannot be considered as 
offering him effective protection of his right to respect for his private life.’64 
As a result, when individuals try to obtain data about their origin and the Contracting States do not 
share concerning information, the ECtHR generally takes the part of the individuals. ECtHR also 
highlights that information which should be reached to prevent the risks on health and life, should 
also be given the individuals order to protect them. The data in the security files is the other specific 
type of information which the ECtHR may evaluate the issue for the sake of the complaints.    
2.2 Collection, Storing and Disclosure of Personal Data 
Personal data processing as the collection, storing and disclosure of data by the state related an 
individual will interfere with his right to respect for his private law in terms of the Court.65 Therefore, 
the ECtHR is seeking for effective procedures, checks and oversight mechanisms related to data 
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processing. Moreover, the Court is looking for the published framework which the State acts 
concerning these mechanisms.66  
In Leander v Sweden case, it is set out that the storage of data is capable of resulting in a violation 
of the right to respect for private life, though in the case, it did not due to the appropriate 
safeguards.67 The applicant complained that he had been fired from his work in the civil service 
since in the police record he had been seen as a security risk. The Court noted that ‘…where the 
implementation of the law consists of secret measures, not open to scrutiny by the individuals 
concerned or by the public at large, the law itself, as opposed to the accompanying administrative 
practice, must indicate the scope of any discretion conferred on the competent authority with 
sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the 
individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.’68  
In the more recent case of Aycaguer v. France, the applicant complained that he refused to undergo 
a biological test during the prosecution because the result of these tests is stored in the national 
computerised DNA database. Thus, he alleged that identifying his DNA and storing the 
corresponding data amounted to a disproportionate interference with his private life. The Court 
emphasized that: ‘… the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective 
means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, 
such as the sex offences for which the national computerised DNA database was originally created. 
However, such facilities cannot be implemented as part of an abusive drive to maximise the 
information stored in them and the length of time for which they are kept. Indeed, without respect for 
the requisite proportionality vis-à-vis the legitimate aims assigned to such mechanisms, their 
advantages would be outweighed by the serious breaches which they would cause to the rights and 
freedoms which States must guarantee under the Convention to persons under their jurisdiction.’69 
In Z v Finland case, the disclosure of personal data is issued concerning medical information. The 
applicant complained about the failure of the Finnish authorities to prevent the disclosure by the 
press of her identity and her medical condition as an HIV carrier during the court process regarded 
with her husband’s sexual offences. The ECtHR notes that ‘Respecting the confidentiality of health 
data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the Contracting Parties to the Convention. It is 
crucial not only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to preserve his or her 
confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general.’70 However, non-
disclosure of medical personal data may not be considered as an absolute right, the Court 
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highlights that: ‘As to the issues regarding access by the public to personal data, the Court 
recognises that a margin of appreciation should be left to the competent national authorities in 
striking a fair balance between the interest of publicity of court proceedings, on the one hand, and 
the interests of a party or a third person in maintaining the confidentiality of such data, on the other 
hand. The scope of this margin will depend on such factors as the nature and seriousness of the 
interests at stake and the gravity of the interference.’71 
Numerous cases emerged the disclosure of the personal information by the police in the scope of 
the criminal investigations.72 In Craxi v Italy, the applicant was the former Prime Minister of Italy and 
there was a criminal procedure against him. The consent of telephone conversations which 
obtained with the wiretapping by the police was released into the media. The applicant claimed that 
such act was given rise a violation of his right to respect for his private life. The ECtHR expresses 
that ‘… Such persons inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny by both 
journalists and the public at large. However, public figures are entitled to the enjoyment of the 
guarantees set out in Article 8 of the Convention on the same basis as every other person. In 
particular, the public interest in receiving information only covers facts which are connected with the 
criminal charges brought against the accused… The Court also added that some of the 
conversations published by the press did not correspond to a pressing social need. Therefore, the 
interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8 (1) of the ECHR was not proportionate to the 
legitimate aims which could have been pursued.’73 
In some cases, the disclosure of personal data without the individuals’ content may be constituted 
interference of the right to respect for private life. For instance, in Brito Ferrinho Bexiga Villa-Nova v. 
Portugal case, while inspecting the accounts of the applicant’s law firm, the tax authorities realized 
that she had not paid value-added tax, the applicant refused to share her personal bank statements 
with the authorities due to the professional confidentiality and bank secrecy. The local court lifted 
her professional confidentiality and bank secrecy in the prosecution of tax fraud. Thus, she alleged 
that this decision gives rise to a violation of article 8 (1) of the Convention. The ECtHR expressed 
that ‘… the proceedings for lifting the professional confidentiality binding on the applicant in her 
capacity as a lawyer had admittedly been conducted before a judicial body, but without her 
participation. She had not become aware that professional confidentiality and bank secrecy had 
been lifted with regard to her bank statements. Thus, she had not therefore been involved in the 
proceedings at any time and had thus been unable to submit her arguments. … Having regard to 
the lack of procedural guarantees and effective judicial control of the measure complained of, the 
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Court considered that the Portuguese authorities had failed to strike a fair balance in the present 
case between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of the 
applicant’s right to respect for her private life. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 8 of 
the Convention.’74  
Besides, the level of interference to the right for respect private life may vary according to aims for 
which it is being collected, stored or disclosed. Therefore, while the collection of personal data may 
constitute to a justified interference in terms of private life, the context of its retention may not be 
justified.75 In S and Marper v. United Kingdom case, the ECtHR expresses that: ‘…the Court will 
have due regard to the specific context in which the information at issue has been recorded and 
retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used and processed and the 
results that may be obtained.’76 
In sum, collection, storing and disclosure of personal data for purposes of criminal investigation 
generally will concern private life but may be justified in the interests of public safety and prevention 
of crime in the ECtHR jurisprudence. Similarly, the interference involved the collection, storage, and 
retention of personal data may be justified in serious offences.77 In addition, medical personal 
records, taking and storing by the police of public data, storage by tax authorities are the other 
relevant issues may be amounted to an interference with private life if the adequate safeguards are 
absent.  
3. Justification for Interference 
Most incidents of the violation with regard to article 8 (1) by the Contracting State authorities' 
collection, storage or disclose of personal data have been evaluated by the ECtHR as justified 
under article 8(2). Thus, it is crucial to absorb the context of this provision, as interpreted by the 
Court. Article 8(2) establishes three main criteria in order to justify an interference with a person's 
right for respect to private life.78 The interference must be: (i) 'in accordance with the law'; (ii) 
'necessary in a democratic society'; and (iii) in furtherance of at least one of the aims listed in 
paragraph 2 of article 8 as: 'national security', 'public safety', 'economic well-being of the country', 
'prevention of disorder or crime', 'protection of health or morals' or 'protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others'. 
Prescribed by law requires the principle of legality and has two basic elements. Primarily, the 
interference must be compatible with national law.79 Secondly, ‘domestic law must provide 
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protection against arbitrary interference with an individual's right under Article 8.’80  In the Taylor-
Sabori v. the United Kingdom case, the applicant alleged that the interception of his pager 
messages by the police and subsequent reference to them at his trial given rise to an unjustified 
interference. The Court has emphasized that: ‘… the phrase “in accordance with the law” not only 
requires compliance with domestic law but also relates to the quality of that law, requiring it to be 
compatible with the rule of law.’81  
The legality requirement includes two key tests: accessibility and foreseeability.82 These elements 
have been expressed by the ECtHR as: ‘… the law to be accessible to the person concerned, who 
must, moreover, be able to foresee its consequences for him…, the requirement of foreseeability 
implies that the domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate 
indication as to the circumstances in and conditions on which public authorities are empowered to 
take any such measures.’83 Moreover, ‘the law must indicate the scope of any … discretion 
conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, …, to 
give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.’84 
Moreover, if the interference to the rights under article 8 (1) is serious, it is needed for 
comprehensive regulation of the activities that incur the interference.85 For an illustration, in Kruslin 
v. France case in which the applicant complained about the evidence from telephone tapping in 
connection with other proceedings, the Court underlines that: ‘Tapping and other forms of 
interception of telephone conversations represent a serious interference with private life and 
correspondence and must accordingly be based on a "law" that is particularly precise. It is essential 
to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is 
continually becoming more sophisticated.’86 
The interference must be 'necessary in a democratic society' which has often arisen from the 
greater dispute.87 The notion of necessity has been held by the ECtHR as ‘the interference 
corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.’88 The Court has admitted three main justifications for restricting the right to privacy: 
security, morality, and economic well-being, while application of the ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ test to Article 8 ECHR. Next, it evaluates whether a particular interference has been 
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necessary by determining the general interest involved with the violation.89 In this regard, the Court 
has expressed that powers of authorities may be tolerated under the Convention only in so far as 
strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions.90 ‘In practice, this means that there 
must be adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. The assessment depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the 
grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise 
them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law.’91 Thus, the Court evaluates the 
complaints a case by case such guarantees that the State Parties have implemented governing the 
related measures.92  
Besides, when assessing the standard ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under the second 
paragraph of article 8, the ECtHR will invoke the margin of appreciation doctrine.93 ECtHR 
expresses in the Buckley case: ‘As is well established in the Court's case-law, it is for the national 
authorities to make the initial assessment of the "necessity" for the interference, as regards both the 
legislative framework and the particular measure of implementation. Although a margin of 
appreciation is thereby left to the national authorities, their decision remains subject to review by the 
Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention.  The scope of this margin of 
appreciation is not identical in each case but will vary according to the context. Relevant factors 
include the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of 
the activities concerned.94   
As a consequence, when limiting the rights to respect for private life, the Contracting States must 
meet three conditions: the breach should be prescribed by law, it should purpose of the rationales 
designated in the article 8 (2) of ECtHR, and it should be necessary in a democratic society. The 
ﬁrst criterion is generally referred to as the ‘rule of law test’. It stipulates that there must be a law on 
which the interference is based and in which the authorities are provided with the speciﬁc 
competence to act by the democratic law-maker. These legal regulations must be accessible to the 
individuals and be sufﬁciently clear and precise to enable a person to reasonably foresee the 
outcomes of his actions. Lastly, the law must provide effective guarantees against arbitrary 
interferences and the abuse of power by the executive authorities. The second criterion is not a test 
in itself, not only because utter arbitrary interferences will commonly not be provided for by law, but 
also primarily since it is subsumed in the ‘democratic necessity test’. In this test, the Court assesses 
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whether a specific interference is ‘necessary in relation to the aims pursued’. Therefore, second and 
third steps are merged into one test.95   
4. Protection of Privacy in the Digital Age 
As it is seen in terms of mentioned cases, it is easy to determine the infringement in the classic 
privacy incidents or clarify the justifications. Since, the time and the place of the violation, the 
individual harm and the victim could be identified simply in such cases. However, while many 
people were monitoring and the mass data was collecting with the secret surveillance measures 
due to the technological developments, pivotal questions are arising when resolving related 
numerous cases. Firstly, the individual who appeals to the ECtHR related with these surveillance 
activities, how could prove his personal interest and individual harm. The other concern is to identify 
whether these data processing systems are all necessary and proportionate in terms of security. 
Moreover, it may be asked to what extent these systems are efficient. While concluding these 
cases, how the ECtHR can make the proper balance between individual harm and the importance 
of interest. Thus, in this part, these questions are tried to be answered in the light of the Court’s 
approach. In addition, it will be evaluated that while resolving such cases which innovator tests the 
ECtHR accepts.96 
4.1 The ECtHR’s Efforts to Relax Admissible Standards against Current Issues 
The ECtHR emphasizes the individual harm by natural persons when assessing the admissibility of 
cases under article 8.97 The Court expresses that ‘the individuals bringing applications before the 
Court must be able to show that they were “directly affected” by the measure complained of.’98 This 
expression emerges from article 34 of the ECHR, which provides: ‘The Court may receive 
applications from any person, …up of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of 
the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The 
High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.’ 
A conclusion of such emphasis on the individual interests and the personal injury of the complaint is 
that in abstracto claims, in which an applicant makes a complaint about a practice or a law as such, 
without it being implemented or otherwise have an effect on the claimant himself, are proclaimed 
inadmissible. This manner is similar for the actio popularis or class action, in which a societal 
organization challenges a law or policy not from a personal perspective, but with an eye on the 
public interest. Lastly, hypothetical complaints and a priori applications, in which the case regards a 
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possible, future violation by the Contracting State, without any damage having occurred yet, are 
also announced inadmissible.99 The Court expresses that ‘It is only in highly exceptional 
circumstances that an applicant may nevertheless claim to be a victim of a violation of the 
Convention owing to the risk of a future violation.’100 
This induces a serious problem with it for complaints related to mass data collections, whether they 
are taken action on by secret services or by big internet companies because individuals are often 
unknowing that they have been filmed, followed by cookies or subjected to internet monitoring. 
Therefore, merely a few individuals will file a legal complaint. These few people will have problems 
about indicating any individual harm. Moreover, the individual damage arising from data collection 
practices is many times rather hypothetical, since the collection itself generally has little effect on 
the personal autonomy or dignity of an individual and the damage that could result from the 
hypothetic possibility of, for instance, a data breach or the abuse of the data by a future regime. 
Accordingly, complaints related to Big Data process which is introduced as collecting massive data 
without a pre-established aim, about an undefined number of people, will often have a theoretical 
and abstract character.101 
First examinations regarded to the victim-requirement and surveillance measures by the State 
Parties have to begin with Klass and others v. Germany case.102 In this case, the applicants 
complained about the contested German legislation, since it allowed surveillance activities without 
requiring the authorities to inform the persons concerned is not informed of the surveillance 
measures when such measures are terminated. They also claimed that there is no remedy before to 
court due to the ordering and implementation of these measures.103 Although the Court admitted 
that the victim of an alleged breach may bring the complaint, in the concrete case, the applications, 
stated that they may be or may have been subject to secret surveillance, for example, in course of 
legal representation of clients who were themselves subject to surveillance, and that persons have 
been the subject of secret surveillance are not always subsequently informed of the measures 
taken against them. Therefore, the Court assessed that the applicants have to be evaluated as 
victims.104  
The governments claimed that, ‘in order to be able to claim to be the victim of an interference with 
the exercise of the right conferred on him by article 8 (1), it should suffice that a person is in a 
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situation where there is a reasonable risk of his being subjected to secret surveillance.’105 At this 
point, the Court’s approach was significant, it expresses that: ‘an individual may, under certain 
conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret 
measures or of legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures 
were in fact applied to him. The relevant conditions are to be determined in each case according to 
the Convention right or rights alleged to have been infringed, the secret character of the measures 
objected to, and the connection between the applicant and those measures.’106 In this way, the 
ECtHR adopted an in abstracto claim, in place of a hypothetical claim, only the existence of a law 
may constitute a violation of the right to respect for private life.107  
In the more recent case of Weber and Saravia v. Germany, the applicants complained about the 
certain provisions of the Fight Against Crime Act amending the G 10 Act, in their versions as 
interpreted and modified by the Federal Constitutional Court.108 The first applicant is a freelance 
journalist who works for various German and foreign newspapers, radio and television stations on a 
regular basis. She investigates matters related to surveillance activities. The second applicant took 
messages for the first applicant when she was on assignments, both from her telephone and from 
his own telephone. He then transmitted these messages to wherever she was.109 The ECtHR 
permits in abstracto claims as: ‘The mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the 
secret monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the 
legislation may be applied. This threat necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between 
users of the telecommunications services and thereby amounts in itself to an interference with the 
exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually taken against 
them.’110 
Thus, the Court’s acceptance of in abstracto claim was vital in order to assess the surveillance 
measures. Besides such abstract test, the ECtHR accepted the reasonable likelihood test in 
particular cases. In these cases, the applicant does not know whether a certain surveillance 
practice implemented himself and has no opportunity to determine whether this was so, and cases 
in which an applicant is merely impacted by a law of its all-embracing scope, may be proclaimed 
admissible by the ECtHR under specific situations. At this point, it has to be a possibility that 
someone was impacted by a specific practice, that the complaint was part of a particular group of 
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people classified in the law or had taken place on the activities that could induce such people to 
monitor and surveillance.111   
Therefore, the ECtHR ignore the applications which rely on mysterious clicking noises during phone 
calls. However, it accepted when the applicants are members of a group actively campaigning 
against a particular issue, from which a reasonable fear of active monitoring may be deduced.112 
For instance, in Kennedy v. The United Kingdom case, the Court reflects this approach clearly. In 
the present case, the applicant alleged that his communications were being unlawfully intercepted 
in order to intimidate him and undermine his business activities due to his high profile case and his 
subsequent involvement in campaigning against miscarriages of justice.113 The Court expresses 
that: ‘The applicant has alleged that the fact that calls were not put through to him and that he 
received hoax calls demonstrates a reasonable likelihood (hypothetical harm) that his 
communications are being intercepted. The Court disagrees that such allegations are sufficient to 
support the applicant's contention that his communications have been intercepted. Accordingly, it 
concludes that the applicant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that there was actual 
interception in his case.’114 However, the ECtHR accepts the application in light of his other 
allegations as: ‘… any interception is taking place without lawful basis in order to intimidate him, the 
Court considers that it cannot be excluded that secret surveillance measures were applied to him or 
that he was, at the material time, potentially at risk of being subjected to such measures.’115  
Though, the Court requires the applicants to prove, at least, a reasonable likelihood when the 
security activities are taken place in the narrower scope. In this sense, Hilton v. the United Kingdom 
case was indicative. In the concrete case, the applicant complains that the obtaining, retention and 
application of personal information by the BBC and the Security Service so as adversely to affect 
her prospects of being appointed to a particular post, without any opportunity for her to know or to 
comment on the accuracy of the information. The Court notes that ‘ The Klass and others v. 
Germany case falls to be distinguished from the present case in that there existed a legislative 
framework in that case which governed the use of secret measures and that this legislation 
potentially affected all users of postal and telecommunications services.  In the present case the 
category of persons likely to be affected by the measures in question is significantly narrower. On 
the other hand, the Commission considers that it should be possible in certain cases to raise a 
complaint such as is made by the applicant without the necessity of proving the existence of a file of 
personal information. To fall into the latter category the Commission is of the opinion that applicants 
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must be able to show that there is, at least, a reasonable likelihood that the Security Service has 
compiled and continues to retain personal information about them.’116 
The other principle is the chilling effect (future harm) which the Court is also willing to embrace in 
particular cases regarded with article 8 of the ECHR, mainly when they concerned surveillance 
activities, and besides, related with laws that distinguish or stigmatize particular groups in society. 
This effect induces people to limit their behaviour and avert from specific acts which they consider 
as possibly inciting negative outcomes. At this point, the ECtHR is willing to admit that even no 
damage has been done yet to a complaint, he might still allege his priori claim if it is probably that 
he will be effected from the harm in the future. Since he is curtailed in his right for respect to private 
life by the authorities or he will invoke in the limitation of using his rights.117     
In this context, the case of Michaud v. France could be evaluated as an instance. The applicant 
claimed that as a lawyer he was obliged, subject to disciplinary action, to report people who came to 
him for advice because lawyers were required to report suspicious operations. He assessed this to 
be incompatible with the principles of lawyer-client privilege and professional confidentiality.118 The 
Government asserted that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim”. They discussed that his 
rights had not actually been affected in practice, emphasizing that he did not allege that the 
legislation in question had been applied to his detriment, but simply that he had been requested to 
organise his practice accordingly and introduce special internal procedures. Therefore the 
Government warned against the extensive application of this concept, which would open the door to 
class actions.119  
The Court noted that ‘in order to be able to lodge an application a person must be able to claim to 
be a “victim” of a violation of the rights enshrined in the Convention … It is, however, open to a 
person to contend that a law violates his rights, in the absence of an individual measure of 
implementation, and therefore to claim to be a “victim” …, if he is required to either modify his 
conduct or risk being prosecuted, or if he is a member of a class of people who risk being directly 
affected by the legislation.’120 
The ECtHR stresses that ‘if the applicant fails to report suspicious activities as required he will 
expose himself by virtue of this text to disciplinary sanctions up to and including being struck off. 
The Court also considers credible the applicant’s suggestion that, as a lawyer specialising in 
financial and tax law, he is even more concerned by these obligations than many of his colleagues 
and exposed to the consequences of failure to comply. In fact he is faced with a dilemma 
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comparable, … either he applies the rules and relinquishes his idea of the principle of lawyer-client 
privilege, or he decides not to apply them and exposes himself to disciplinary sanctions and even 
being struck off. Thus, the Court accepts that the applicant is directly affected by the impugned 
provisions and may therefore claim to be a “victim” …’121 
The Court tries to abandon its approach as strictly focusing on personal harm when cases related to 
potential discrimination and stigmatization of weaker groups in society. For instance, in S.A.S v. 
France case in which the applicant complained about the ban on wearing clothing designed to 
conceal one’s face in public places, deprived her of the possibility of wearing the full-face veil in 
public.122 The ECtHR determines that: ‘Furthermore, the applicant admittedly does not claim to have 
been convicted – or even stopped or checked by the police – for wearing the fullface veil in a public 
place. An individual may nevertheless argue that a law breaches his or her rights in the absence of 
a specific instance of enforcement, and thus claim to be a “victim”, if he or she is required either to 
modify his or her conduct or risk being prosecuted, or if he or she is a member of a category of 
persons who risk being directly affected by the legislation. This is the case … for women who, like 
the applicant, live in France and wish to wear the full-face veil for religious reasons. They are thus 
confronted with a dilemma comparable …: either they comply with the ban and thus refrain from 
dressing in accordance with their approach to religion; or they refuse to comply and face 
prosecution.123  
This attitude is becoming increasingly crucial in cases concerning surveillance activities by the 
Contracting Parties, in which the ECtHR is also willing to accept chilling effects and surveillance 
activities. Sample case may be Colon v. the Netherlands.124 In the present case, the applicant 
claimed that the designation of a security risk area by the Burgomaster violated his right to respect 
for privacy as it enabled a public prosecutor to conduct random searches of people over an 
extensive period in a large area without this mandate being subject to any judicial review.125 
Contrary to this, the Government argued that the designation of a security risk area or the issuing of 
a stop-and-search order had not in itself constituted an interference with the applicant’s private life 
or liberty of movement. Since the event complained of, several preventive search operations had 
been conducted; in none of them, apparently, had the applicant been subjected to further attempts 
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to search him. This was enough to show that the likelihood of an interference with the applicant’s 
rights was so minimal as to deprive him of the status of victim.126 
The ECtHR emphasized that: ‘In principle, it is not sufficient for individual applicants to claim that 
the mere existence of the legislation violates their rights under the Convention; it is necessary that 
the law should have been applied to their detriment. Nevertheless, Article 34 entitles individuals to 
contend that legislation violates their rights by itself, in the absence of an individual measure of 
implementation, if they run the risk of being directly affected by it; that is, if they are required either 
to modify their conduct or risk being prosecuted, or if they are members of a class of people who 
risk being directly affected by the legislation. The Court is not disposed to doubt that the applicant 
was engaged in lawful pursuits for which he might reasonably wish to visit the part of Amsterdam 
city centre designated as a security risk area. This made him liable to be subjected to search orders 
should these happen to coincide with his visits there. The events of 19 February 2004, followed by 
the criminal prosecution occasioned by the applicant’s refusal to submit to a search, leave no room 
for doubt on this point. It follows that the applicant can claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of 
Article 34 of the Convention and the Government’s alternative preliminary objection must be 
rejected also.’127 
Therefore, the Court’s approach was more flexible in terms of complaints about legislation 
authorising surveillance programmes. Such as, Lordachi v. Moldavia case, the Court has pointed 
out that128: ‘The mere existence of the legislation entails, for all those who might fall within its reach, 
a menace of surveillance; this menace necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between 
users of the postal and telecommunications services and thereby constitutes an ‘interference by a 
public authority’ with the exercise of the applicants’ right to respect for correspondence.’129 
In sum, the Court’s approach related to the notion of the victim has changed in certain types of 
cases, commonly cases concerning surveillance activities and data retention, either by secret 
services or other governmental institutions. The ECtHR tries to make it’s standards flexible in terms 
of admissibility criteria. It is occasionally willing to permit the hypothetical complaints if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the applicant has been harmed, it is sometimes willing to admit a priori 
claims, particularly when the mere existence of acts and policies forced the applicant to restrict 
using his right to privacy.130 The reaction of the ECtHR refrains from the current evolvement known 
as Big Data which is introduced as collecting massive data without a pre-established aim, about an 
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undefined number of people. 131 In these conditions, the ECtHR seems to find new formulations in 
the different areas of its jurisprudence when evaluating the right to privacy.132  
4.2 Balancing Test whether the Approach of the ECtHR is Adequate in the Era of Mass Data 
Even if surveillance activities and data retention were evaluated under the article 8 of the ECHR, 
and even if the related cases were announced admissible, it is still highly controversial whether the 
ECtHR would conclude the cases in favour of the applicants. Previously mentioned, privacy 
restrictions are permitted when they are in accordance with the law and necessity in a democratic 
society in connection to, among others; national security, public health, and economic-wellbeing in 
terms of article 8 (2). The authors of the ECHR kept in mind that the consequences of a case must 
be determined by an evaluation of the necessity of a breach, inter alia by assessing the 
effectiveness, proportionality, and subsidiary of a specific measure. Besides, using this intrinsic test 
occasionally, the ECtHR has been moved to the background and is increasingly supplemented by a 
‘balancing test’.133  
Setting out that the regulation is necessary in a democratic society includes indicating that the 
action taken is in response to a pressing social need. Moreover, the interference with the rights 
safeguarded is no greater than is necessary to address that pressing social need. At this point, the 
latter requirement is referred to as the test of proportionality. The Court should take into account the 
balance between the severity of the restriction placed on the individual and the importance of the 
public interest.134  
Therefore, to determine the outcome of a case, the ECtHR balances the damage a particular 
privacy violation has done to the individual interest of an applicant against its instrumentality 
towards protecting a social interest as national safety. However, with data processes, the relation 
between the data collection and processing of personal data of a certain person, and the useful 
results for the promotion of national security is mostly ambiguous and abstract, not in the last place, 
since the data collection begins before a particular suspicion has emerged, not afterwards. Namely, 
data are collected and processed, merely to assess at a later legal point which data are precious 
and for what aim they may be used. Particularly in legal cases, it is commonly difficult to decide 
what beneficial results the data collection of this specific person has had on the promotion of 
national safety. These situations are different from classic privacy breaches where, for instance, 
data was collected about a particular person to understand whether he had committed a crime.135 
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Besides, the other question may be emerged as to how effective these data processing systems 
are. Since it is difficult to sort out these mass data in order to use the related information for security 
purposes.136  
‘As a result, during the past four decades the United States of America national security agency has 
dramatically increased the amount of the raw material that it collects, even while it has produced 
less and less intelligence information … in the 1980s, agency processed, analysed, and reported 
approximately 20 percent of the communications traffic it intercepted. Today, that number has 
dropped to less than 1 percent.’137 Thus, it is obvious that the effectiveness of data processed 
activities is controversial in order to maintain public security.  
In the light of these challenges, balancing test seems unﬁt for the cases related to surveillance 
activities.138 In this regard, The Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom is the core 
case in terms of mass data issue, this is the first time that the Court has been asked to consider the 
Convention compliance of an intelligence sharing regime.139 In this case, ‘the applicants complained 
about the scope and magnitude of the electronic surveillance programmes operated by the 
Government of the United Kingdom. The applicants accepted that the bulk interception regime had 
a basis in domestic law. However, they argued that it lacked the quality of law because it was so 
complex as to be inaccessible to the public and to the Government, reliance was placed on 
arrangements which were substantially “below the waterline” rather than on clear and binding legal 
guidelines, and it lacked sufficient guarantees against abuse.’   
As it is seen in this case, the intelligence services of many other States, collect and process a large 
amount of personal information to, among other things, fight against terrorism. Though it might 
occasionally be difficult to prove the general interest served with these types of process, the ECtHR 
permit a wide margin of appreciation to countries in which the rationale of national safety is evoked, 
which is permitted by the ECtHR when it is relevant to issues of terrorism. Therefore, the Court 
does leave some room to the governments when it comes to determining the social interest 
included with big data processes.140  
However, the ECtHR’s permission related to the wide margin of appreciation does not mean, the 
Court will not leave its role as European supervisor. Moreover, the Court will continue to assess the 
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activities of the state. Initially, it should be underlined that the ECtHR is trying to focus on procedural 
conditions.141 
Therefore the ECtHR expresses that ‘In its case-law on secret measures of surveillance, the Court 
has developed the following minimum safeguards that should be set out in statute law in order to 
avoid abuses of power: the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a 
definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of 
telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; 
the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in 
which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.’142 Moreover, the Court adds that:  
‘… the bulk interception regime, itself, did not violate the Convention, but noted that such a regime 
had to respect criteria set down in its case-law.’143 
However, it should be emphasized that, though the requirement that a privacy breach must be 
prescribed by law also applies to the activities of secret services, it is precisely related with the 
intelligence organizations that a separate and rather restricted legal regulations exist, thus generally 
neither the ordinary citizens nor the governments will aware exactly what activities are conducted 
and with which specific aims. From this respect, again, the balancing test does not seem suitable 
for mass data systems.144 
Accordingly, it may be encouraging to look at the necessity case in order to address issues related 
with the complaint about the act of British secret services, since this test is developed for cases as 
relevant to security interests. Moreover, it seems logical to apply a necessity test when a data 
gathering is executed with a specific goal in mind; for instance, a certain person, group, or institution 
is suspected of making plans for criminal activity and data are gathered about them and their plans 
to obstruct these activities or prosecute them. Whenever there is at least a slight suspicion that a 
particular person or group may be planning to commit a crime, there is an adequately clear general 
interest the government can refer.145  
However, at this point, another problem emerges regarded with mass data processes. Indeed, data 
are not gathered for a particular aim or reason, rather they are obtained, stored, and analysed to 
ﬁnd patterns, statistical correlations, and for the formulation of group proﬁles.146 Merely 
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subsequently it becomes clear what data are essential and for what goals they may be used. As the 
applicants related with mass data processes, such as the one submitted recently, usually do not 
regard the particular use of the data for determined goals, but the data collecting as such, it will be 
hard to impossible for data collectors, such as the state, to clarify at that point what public interest is 
served with the data gathering and to what extent. In consequence, the necessity test requires a 
clear societal interest, which is usually not easy to prove in mass data processes.147  
Therefore, perhaps, it is more encouraging to apply the unreasonable burden test. In this test, the 
most important advantage is that the societal interest is assumed by the Court, which is a beneﬁt in 
respect to the necessity test. Though, the individual interest needs to be shown, which, previously 
mentioned, substantiate difficultly in big data processes. Still, the ECtHR does not oblige harm or a 
setback to interest as such but only a ‘burden’, which is applied by the Court as a rather ﬂexible 
term. Moreover, particularly the ECtHR has done something in these types of cases, namely, it has 
adopted as main notion whether the ‘quality of life’ of the applicant has been harmed. The challenge 
related with numerous environmental cases, like the cases concerning Big Data, the context of 
harm is so problematic. What harm causes noise pollution for the individual in terms of private or 
family life? How can one prove, for instance, that illnesses have arisen from smog or air pollution? 
Even if individual harm can be shown, the causal connection between environmental pollution and 
individual harm is often not easy to demonstrate. This is exactly why the ECtHR has used the notion 
of ‘quality of life’, as to whether the ‘quality of life’ is diminished can in principle merely be 
determined by the subject itself. Therefore, the notion of harm becomes a subjective, rather than an 
objective, matter.148 
In this sense, the first case is Branduse v. Romania149 in which the applicant complained among 
others about the offensive smells created by a former refuse tip situated about 20 metres away from 
the prison he was jailed, alleging that its quality of life and its welfare were affected by the 
respective smells. Though at the starting point it was evaluated that the applicant will not win this 
case, the Court determined that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR since the 
Romanian authorities failed to take the adequate measures to solve the problem.150 
Similarly, the other significant example is Ledyayeva, Dobrokhotova, Zolotareva and Romashina v. 
Russia case in which the applicants claimed that the operation of a steel-plant in close proximity to 
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their homes endangered their health and well-being. Moreover, they complained that the 
government’s failure to protect their private lives and homes from severe environmental nuisance 
arising from this steel plant’s industrial activities. 151  
The Governments submitted that the domestic courts had never examined the influence of industrial 
pollution on the applicants' health nor assessed the damage caused by it, because the applicants 
had not raised these issues in the domestic proceedings. Numerous examinations of the state of 
environmental pollution in the town did not reveal any extreme cases of environmental pollution. 
The applicants have failed to use the means prescribed by the Russian legislation for assessing 
environmental hazards… The Government stressed that the environmental monitoring carried out 
by State agencies revealed an improvement in the overall environmental situation throughout the 
town, and that the pollution levels near the applicants' houses did not differ significantly from the 
average levels across the town.152  
The ECtHR expressed that: ‘… in many cases the existence of an interference with a Convention 
right is evident and does not give rise to any discussion, in other cases it is a subject of controversy. 
The present four applications belong to this second category. There is no doubt that serious 
industrial pollution negatively affects public health in general. However, it is often impossible to 
quantify its effects in each individual case, and distinguish them from the influence of other relevant 
factors, such as age, profession etc. The same concerns possible worsening of the quality of life 
caused by the industrial pollution. The “quality of life” is a very subjective characteristic which hardly 
lends itself to a precise definition.’153  
Therefore, within this term, the Court could announce that the case is admissible. Though the idea 
of relatively abstract public interests and subjective personal interests is a very promising beginning 
step, it is not adequate to enable the ECtHR to deal with current privacy breaches arising from 
mass data processes. Since it still focuses on the burden on particular individual claimants, while 
big data processes do not concern persons or small groups, but rather have an impact on 
everyone.154 
In sum, it is not clear how the Court may approach these controversial issues related with the Big 
Data processes in a satisfactorily way. The ECtHR has usually applied three tests it has evolved to 
cope with different privacy questions, one in which the Court has considered the balance between 
the severity of the limitation placed on the individual and the importance of the public interest, other 
in which it has focused the necessity of the restriction, and a third in which it has applied the 
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unreasonable burden test it balances both interests. However, neither of these tests is adequate in 
order to resolve concerning cases.155  Thus, a new test or approach needs to be improved, in which 
both interests weighed are formulated on a general and abstract level. Since there are already lacks 
of such an approach available in the Court’s jurisprudence.156  
5. Conclusion 
To summarize briefly, although ECHR does not contain any provision which refers explicitly to the 
right for the safeguarding of personal data, data privacy falls within the scope of article 8 of ECHR 
according to the Court. The ECtHR has closed this gap by a broad interpretation of the concept of 
private life.157  
The Court expresses that the collection, storage and disclosure by the Contracting Parties of 
information and data related to individuals with or without their consent, as well as their 
accessibility, will always concern a person’s private life.158 In this regard, for instance, person’s 
name, photo, or physical and moral integrity159, recording of fingerprints, images, cell samples, DNA 
profiles160, medical data,161 ethnic identity,162 banking documents163 are evaluated as personal data 
in the jurisprudence of the Court within its wide interpretation. 
Article 8 (2) of the ECHR expresses that the protection of the right to respect for private life is not 
absolute and this article provides the conditions in which the Court allows the State Parties to limit 
such rights.164 In this regard, the Contracting States should take into account three situations: the 
interference should be prescribed by law, it should purpose of the rationales designated in the 
article 8 (2) of ECtHR, and it should be necessary in a democratic society. The ﬁrst criterion is 
generally accepted as the ‘rule of law test’. It implies that there must be a law on which the 
interference is based and in which the authorities are provided with the speciﬁc competence to act 
by the democratic law-maker. This law must be accessible to the individuals and be sufﬁciently 
clear and precise to enable a person to reasonably foresee the outcomes of his actions. Finally, the 
law must provide effective guarantees against arbitrary interferences and the abuse of power by the 
executive authorities.165  
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These criteria could be adequate to ascertain the infringement in the traditional privacy cases or it is 
easy to justify the violations as the personal harm and the victim could be clarified simply in these 
cases. The ECtHR could provide a balance between individual harm and the importance of interest 
while resolving such cases. Thus, balancing test is an effective tool in terms of determining the 
classic privacy cases by the ECtHR.166  
However, personal computing and the internet have made it possible for a wider range of people – 
involving scholars, marketers, secret services, governmental agencies, educational institutions, and 
motivated individuals – to produce, share, interact with, and organize data.167 At a time when it is 
easier than ever to monitor the attitude of persons, governments now rely on collecting all sorts of 
data from their citizens for the detention of criminal activities. While older forms of surveillance 
included monitoring only those suspected of offences (for instance, through wiretapping their 
phones or following their movements), new techniques involve collating massive amounts of 
personal data – regarding, for instance, phone calls, e-mail use and social media interactions – from 
large numbers of people, most of whom governmental institutions officials have no reason to 
believe are guilty of anything. The resulting data sets are then analysed in order to uncover 
potential criminal threats. These programs, however, are highly debated.168 Therefore, in our current 
World, the types of cases related to the personal data are not as simple as these classic cases due 
to the developments in the technology and particularly advance in the internet area. Accordingly, 
key questions are arising when resolving these new types of cases.  
As highlighted above, in Big Data processes, it becomes rather difficult to designate harm to an 
individual's interests. Usually, an individual is simply unaware that his personal data is collected by 
either his fellow citizens (e.g. via the use of their smartphones), by companies (e.g. by following 
cookies), or by governments (e.g. through covert surveillance). But even if a person has the 
awareness of these data gatherings, given the fact that data collection and processing is so 
omnipresent and common, it will unlikely be possible for him to keep up with every data processing 
which involves his data, to evaluate whether the data controller complies with the legal standards 
applicable, and if not, to file a legal complaint. And if a person does apply to the court to protect his 
rights, he has to demonstrate an individual interest, that is personal harm, which is a significantly 
challenging notion in Big Data processes. While the traditional approach is centered upon individual 
rights and individual interests, data processing is usually related with structural and societal issues. 
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Connecting these types of processes to personal harm to individual's autonomy, dignity, or negative 
freedom demonstrates increasingly difficult.169 
Therefore, how the Court handles the emergence of an era of Big Data is critical as a paramount 
human right body. To deal with these issues, the Court has been willing to adopt a slight relaxation 
of the requirement of personal harm and individual interest. Regarding presumed surveillance 
activities about which no insight was given by the secret services, the Court expressed that it is not 
acceptable170 that "the assurance of the enjoyment of a right guaranteed by the convention could be 
thus removed by the simple fact that the person concerned is kept unaware of its violation."171  
Likely, in some cases, the ECtHR has also been prepared to accept a broader interpretation 
regarding to the complaints about law authorizing surveillance regimes, which is drafted in very 
broad and common terms. Moreover, cases in which the applicant does not know whether he was 
subjected to a specific surveillance activity and has no opportunity to detect whether this was so, 
and cases in which a plaintiff is solely affected by law by way of its all-encompassing scope, may be 
announced admissible by the ECtHR under certain situations. On this point, it must be plausible that 
someone was influenced by a specific practice, that the applicant is part of a particular group of 
people designated in the law or had engaged in activities that could lead to monitoring and 
surveillance. Thus, the ECtHR acknowledges as a matter of principle that to be granted a right of 
complaint, there must be the existence of a "reasonable likelihood" that the applicant has been 
subjected to a surveillance or monitoring practice.172 In this regard, the Court is sometimes willing to 
allow the hypothetical complaints or future harm if there is a reasonable likelihood that the applicant 
has been harmed, it occasionally willing to adopt a priori claims, particularly when the mere 
existence of law and policies obliged the applicant to limit using his right to privacy.173 
The other problematic issue is to make a proper balance of interests in this type of Big Data 
regimes as in these systems, both the public and personal interest are rather hypothetical and 
abstract, as indicated earlier. To handle with these issues, in data processing cases the ECtHR has 
tried to stay focused on the quality of the Contracting States’ law and governmental activities.174 
‘The Court must be satisfied that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.’175 
‘According to the Court's case‑law, the fact that persons concerned by such measures are not 
apprised of them while the surveillance is in progress or even after it has ceased cannot by itself 
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warrant the conclusion that the interference was not justified under the terms of paragraph 2 of 
Article 8, as it is the very unawareness of the surveillance which ensures its efficacy. However, as 
soon as notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of the surveillance after its 
termination, the information should be provided to the persons concerned.’176  
The Court has generally used three tests it has evolved to deal with different privacy issues. In the 
balancing test, the Court has taken into account the balance between the seriousness of the 
restriction taken placed on the individual and the importance of the public interest. The other test is 
the necessity test in which it has focused the necessity of the limitation. In the third test, the Court 
has applied the unreasonable burden test it balances both interests. However, these tests are not 
efficient in order to resolve concerning cases.177  
In this respect, The Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom is the landmark case. The 
Court expresses that:  ‘… the bulk interception regime, itself did not violate the Convention, but 
noted that such a regime had to respect criteria set down in its case-law.’178 The ECtHR’s judgment 
is a vital step towards safeguarding individuals from unjustified intrusion as it has serious 
implications not only for the UK's data process, but also for the mass surveillance activities of the 
Council of Europe's other member states, and for such practices in other parts of the world.179  
However, the ECtHR’s these affords are not adequate in order to cope with the Big Data process 
challenge. Although a set of principles to counter data protection interferences are applied in 
different ways and generate different species of legal protection, the case-specific approach of the 
Court to all these interferences reflects the complex systems to assess the violations.180 Moreover, 
given the difficulty in dealing with all these interferences related to mass data, it is clear that 
innovator approaches and tests are needed to implement in a systematic way in order to assure the 
individuals that the Big Brother is not watching them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176 ibid para 90. 
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